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Abstract
Model checking strategic abilities in multi-agent
systems is hard, especially for agents with partial
observability of the state of the system. In that
case, it ranges from NP-complete to undecidable,
depending on the precise syntax and the semantic
variant. That, however, is the worst case complex-
ity, and the problem might as well be easier when
restricted to particular subclasses of inputs. In this
paper, we look at the verification of models with
“extreme” epistemic structure, and identify several
special cases for which model checking is easier
than in general. We also prove that, in the other
cases, no gain is possible even if the agents have
almost full (or almost nil) observability. To prove
the latter kind of results, we develop generic tech-
niques that may be useful also outside of this study.
1 Introduction
Many relevant properties of multi-agent systems (MAS) refer
to strategic abilities of agents and their groups. Such proper-
ties can be neatly specified in alternating-time temporal logic
(ATL) [Alur et al., 2002]. In its basic version, the logic al-
lows to specify strategic properties of agents and their coali-
tions under the assumption of perfect information about the
current state of affairs. As the assumption is rather unrealis-
tic, there is a growing number of works that study the syntac-
tic and semantic variants of ATL for agents with imperfect
information, cf. [A˚gotnes et al., 2015] for an overview.
Unfortunately, verification of strategic properties of agents
with imperfect information is difficult. More precisely, model
checking of ATL variants with imperfect information is
∆P2 - to PSPACE-complete for agents playing memory-
less (a.k.a. positional) strategies [Bulling et al., 2010; Jam-
roga and Dix, 2006a; Schobbens, 2004] and EXPTIME-
complete to undecidable for agents with perfect recall of the
past [Dima and Tiplea, 2011; Guelev et al., 2011]. This con-
curs with the results for solving imperfect information games
and synthesis of winning strategies, which are also known to
be hard [Doyen and Raskin, 2011; Chatterjee et al., 2007;
Peterson and Reif, 1979]. Note, however, that theoretical
complexity results refer to the worst case complexity. The
problem might as well be easier when restricted to a particu-
lar subclass of inputs. Indeed, many hard problems have rel-
atively small “hardness cores,” and are fairly easy elsewhere.
In this paper, we study some natural restrictions on models,
that might lead to cheaper verification. More specifically, we
look at models with “extreme” epistemic structure, arising
when the agents have almost nil, or, symmetrically, almost
perfect observability. A sensor observing only one variable,
with a fixed number of possible values, provides a natural ex-
ample of the former type. For the latter class, consider a cen-
tral controller monitoring a team of robots, with only a fixed
number of units being unavailable at a time. It turns out that,
when we consistently pair those restrictions with the assump-
tions about agents’ memory (i.e., assume almost perfect ob-
servability and perfect recall, or almost nil observability and
no recall), model checking can become easier than in general.
This applies especially to the verification of abilities of sin-
gleton coalitions. We also show that no gain is possible for
the other combinations. To prove the latter kind of results, we
develop general reduction techniques which may be relevant
also for other formal problems in AI.
2 Model Checking Strategic Abilities
2.1 ATL: What Agents Can Achieve
Alternating-time temporal logic ATL [Alur et al., 2002] gen-
eralizes branching time logic CTL by replacing path quan-
tifiers with cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉. Informally, 〈〈A〉〉γ
expresses that the group of agents A has a collective strat-
egy to enforce temporal property γ. ATL formulae include
temporal operators: “X” (“in the next state”), “G” (“always
from now on”) and U (“until”). The additional operator “F”
(“now or sometime in the future”) is defined as Fγ ≡ >U γ.
The language of ATL is given by the grammar below,
where A is a set of agents, and p is an atomic proposition:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ | 〈〈A〉〉Gϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ.
2.2 Models of Multi-Agent Interaction
The semantics of ATL is defined over a variant of tran-
sition systems where transitions are labeled with combina-
tions of actions, one per agent. Formally, a concurrent
game structure (CGS) [Alur et al., 2002] is a tuple M =
〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉 which includes a nonempty finite
set of all agents Agt = {1, . . . , k}, a nonempty set of
states St, a set of atomic propositions Π and their valuation
pi : Π → 2St\{∅}, and a nonempty finite set of (atomic) ac-
tions Act. Function d : Agt × St → 2Act defines nonempty
sets of actions available to agents at each state, and o is a
(deterministic) transition function that assigns the outcome
state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and a tuple of actions
αi ∈ d(i, q) that can be executed by Agt in q.
In the rest of the paper, we will write di(q) instead of
d(i, q), and we will denote the set of collective choice of
group A at state q by dA(q) =
∏
i∈A di(q).
Concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGM) [van der
Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003; Schobbens, 2004], are CGS’s
augmented with a family of equivalence relations ∼a⊆ St×
St, one per agent a ∈ Agt. The relations describe agents’
uncertainty: q ∼a q′ means that agent a cannot distinguish
between states q and q′. It is also required that agents have
the same choices in indistinguishable states: if q ∼a q′ then
da(q) = da(q
′). The abstraction classes of∼a are sometimes
called information sets. We use #is to denote the maximum
number of information sets per agent, and |is| for the size of
the largest information set in the CEGM.
Paths, histories, further epistemic relations. A path λ =
q0q1q2 . . . is an infinite sequence of states such that there is
a transition between each qi, qi+1. We use λ[i] to denote the
ith position on path λ (starting from i = 0). The set of paths
starting in q is denoted by Paths[M ](q), and the set of their
finite prefixes by Paths[M ]fin(q).
A history h is a finite sequence of states. We use hF to
denote its final state. Two histories h = q0q1 . . . qn and
h′ = q′0q
′
1 . . . q
′
n′ are indistinguishable for agent a (h ≈a h′)
iff n = n′ and qi ∼a q′i for i = 1, . . . , n. Additionally,
for any equivalence relation R over a set X we use [x]R to
denote the equivalence class of x. Moreover, we use the ab-
breviations ∼A:=
⋃
a∈A ∼a and ≈A:=
⋃
a∈A ≈a. Note that
relations∼A and≈A implement the “everybody knows” type
of collective knowledge.
2.3 Semantic Variants of Strategic Ability
A number of semantic variations have been proposed for
ATL, cf. e.g. [Jamroga, 2003; Schobbens, 2004; Jamroga
and van der Hoek, 2004; A˚gotnes et al., 2007; A˚gotnes and
Walther, 2009]. In this paper, we study the ”canonical” vari-
ants as proposed in [Schobbens, 2004]. There, a taxonomy of
four strategy types was introduced and labeled as follows: I
(resp. i) stands for perfect (resp. imperfect) information, and
R (resp. r) refers to perfect recall (resp. no recall). The se-
mantics of ATL can be parameterized with the strategy type.
Here, we are only concerned with imperfect knowledge, i.e.,
semantic variants of ATL denoted by ATLir and ATLiR.
Strategies and their outcomes. The following types of
strategies are used in the respective semantic variants:
• ir: sa : St → Act s.t. sa(q) ∈ da(q) for all q, with the
constraint that q ∼a q′ implies sa(q) = sa(q′);
• iR: sa : St+ → Act s.t. sa(q0 . . . qn) ∈ da(qn) for
all q0, . . . , qn, with the constraint that h ≈a h′ implies
sa(h) = sa(h
′).
That is, strategy sa is a conditional plan that specifies a’s ac-
tion in each state of the system (for memoryless agents) or
Single agents Coalitions
Memoryless ∆P2 -complete ∆P2 -complete
Perfect recall EXPTIME-complete undecidable
Figure 1: Existing complexity results
for every possible history of the system evolution (for agents
with perfect recall). Moreover, strategies specify the same
choices for indistinguishable states (resp. histories). Collec-
tive xy-strategies sA are tuples of individual xy-strategies sa,
one per a ∈ A.
The “objective outcome” function out(q, sA) returns the
set of all paths that may occur when agentsA execute strategy
sA from state q onward. The set of “subjectively possible
outcomes” is defined as outi(q, sA) =
⋃
q∼Aq′ out(q
′, sA).
Semantic relation. The semantics of ATL, parameterized
by the type of available strategies, can now be given by the
following clauses:
M, q |=xy p iff q ∈ pi(p), where p ∈ Π;
M, q |=
xy
¬ϕ iff M, q 6 |=
xy
ϕ;
M, q |=
xy
ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q |=
xy
ϕ and M, q |=
xy
ψ;
M, q |=
xy
〈〈A〉〉Xϕ iff there is a collective xy-strategy sA
such that, for each path λ ∈ outx(q, sA), we have
M,λ[1] |=
xy
ϕ;
M, q |=
xy
〈〈A〉〉Gϕ iff there exists sA such that, for each λ ∈
outx(q, sA), we have M,λ[i] |=xy ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |=
xy
〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ iff there exists sA such that, for each
λ ∈ outx(q, sA), there is i ≥ 0 for which M,λ[i] |=xy ψ,
and M,λ[j] |=
xy
ϕ for each 0 ≤ j < i,
where outI is used instead of out, for brevity. Moreover, we
will also make a single use of the “objective” version of the
semantics, denoted by |=O
ir
. This auxilliary semantics is de-
fined almost exactly as |=ir , the only difference being “sub-
jectively possible outcomes” replaced by the “objective” out-
come function.
2.4 Known Complexity Results
In this paper, we focus on verifying MAS with imperfect in-
formation, i.e., on model checking ATLir and ATLiR. The
former problem is known to be ∆P2 -complete [Schobbens,
2004; Jamroga and Dix, 2006a].1 The latter problem is un-
decidable in general [Dima and Tiplea, 2011], but it be-
comes EXPTIME-complete when only singleton coali-
tions are allowed in the formula (the upper bound follows
from [Guelev et al., 2011, Prop. 33], the lower bound
from [Reif, 1984]). A brief summary of the results is pre-
sented in Figure 1; a more comprehensive overview can be
found in [Bulling et al., 2010]. All the complexity results in
this paper are given w.r.t. the number of transitions in the
model and the length of the formula.
In contrast, model checking ATLIr and ATLIR is much
cheaper, namely P-complete [Alur et al., 2002].
1 Where ∆P2 = PNP is the class of problems solvable in poly-
nomial time by a deterministic Turing machine sending adaptive
queries to an oracle for NP.
Single agents Small info sets Few info sets
(|is| = const) (#is = const)
Memoryless I∆P2 -complete P-complete
Perfect recall P-complete inPSPACE for #is = 1
EXPTIME-c. for #is > 1
Figure 2: Model checking complexity for abilities of single agents
3 Abilities of Single Agents: Imperfect Recall
Model checking agents with imperfect information is signif-
icantly harder than ones with perfect information. But what
if the agents have almost perfect information, e.g., their in-
formation sets are of size at most 2? Or, symmetrically, they
have almost no incoming information (say, all the states are
split between only 1 or 2 information sets)? In this paper, we
systematically study the subproblems generated by such as-
sumptions. In the next two sections we look at the simpler
case of individual abilities, i.e., when only singleton coali-
tions are allowed in the formulae. We refer to the fragment
of ATL containing only such formulae as 1ATL. Later, in
Section 5, we consider arbitrary coalitional strategies.
Summary. To help the reader navigate through the maze
of formal arguments, we summarize our findings now. An
outline of the main results is presented in Figure 2. On the
one hand, we distinguish between agents playing memory-
less strategies (i.e., ATLir) and agents with perfect recall
(i.e., ATLiR). On the other hand, we look at models of al-
most perfect information (information sets of constant size,
or bounded by a constant) and models of almost nil observ-
ability (constant number of information sets per agent). The
cases with complexity lower than for the general problem are
highlighted. As it turns out, if we consistently pair weak ob-
servability with weak recall, or almost perfect observability
with perfect recall, model checking becomes easy. Interest-
ingly, the complexity decreases also in the case of blindfold
memoryful agents (essentially, agents who can only count).
We also note that our hardness results can be interesting
from the technical point of view, as to obtain them we propose
some powerful reductions that transform the general problem
to a very special case.
3.1 Agents that Don’t Miss Much (Small Info Sets)
Let us focus on the case of imperfect knowledge and recall.
It can be argued that under this semantics ATL retains most
of its appeal as a tool for realistic modeling of open systems,
as we avoid the problem of omniscience of the agents while
disallowing infinite memory.
Decidability of model checking ATLir is a nice property,
however its ∆P2 -completeness [Schobbens, 2004; Jamroga
and Dix, 2006b] can be seen as at least a theoretical obsta-
cle for practical applications. Unfortunately, as we show in
what follows, reducing agents’ uncertainty about the local
state (i.e., limiting the size of information sets) does not lead
to better complexity.
Theorem 1. Model checking 1ATLir over CEGMs with in-
formation sets of size at most 2 is ∆P2 -complete.
The core of the proof of the above theorem is based on
showing that the problem of model checking of a certain sub-
set of ATLir is NP-complete. We thus postpone the proof
until we have provided some necessary tools.
Let us denote by ATL1U the subset of ATL formulae that
use only agent 1 in coalitional operators and only the Until
modality. We now build a translation T that transforms for-
mulae and models of ATL1U in a way such that the truth
is preserved and the size of information sets is reduced to at
most two elements. More formally, we have M, q |=ir φ iff
T (M), q |=ir T (φ), for all φ ∈ ATL1U (see Theorem 2).
Let us start with presenting the transformations of formulae.
Formulae Translation We will modify the translated
model by adding new states, hence we introduce a fresh
proposition real used to label the original states. Now, for
each φ, φ′ ∈ ATL1U and p ∈ Π we define:
• T (p)=p, T (φ∧φ′)=T (φ)∧T (φ′), T (¬φ)=¬T (φ),
• T (〈〈1〉〉φUφ′)=〈〈1〉〉(real =⇒ T (φ)) U (real∧T (φ′)).
Model Translation The transformation of models is more
involved. Let M = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi,Act , d, o〉 be an at least
two-agent CEGM s.t. real 6∈ Π. Let q0 ∈ St and Q =
{q0}∼1 = {q0, q1, . . . , qk}, where k > 2. We build a model
MQ that deals with uncertainty represented by Q by extend-
ing strategic capabilities of agent 2 and reducing the size of
information sets for states derived from Q to at most 2.
For convenience, denote Acts = d1(q0) and introduce a
new dummy action nop of agent 2. We also define a magic
number H =
(|Q|
2
) × |Acts| · (|Acts| − 1), later used as the
“height” of the structure that replacesQ after transformation.
Now, for each qi ∈ Q and α ∈ Acts define the set of new
states qi, qαi , q
αα
i , . . . , q
αH
i and denote Q′ = {qα
n
i | qi ∈Q and 0 ≤ n ≤ H} (by convention, a0 = ). We also intro-
duce transitions qα
n
i
(α,nop)−→ qαn+1i for all 0 ≤ n < H . More-
over, we introduce a fresh state sink and put qα
n
i
(β,γ)−→ sink ,
for all 0 < n ≤ H and γ ∈ d2(qi), where α 6= β. Intuitively,
for a given α ∈ Acts , once the transition labeled with α is
selected in qi, the same action a needs to be executed until
reaching qα
H
i if sink is to be avoided.
We now define the indistinguishability relation ∼∗ on Q′
for agent 1 as any equivalence relation on Q′ s.t. for each
q ∈ Q′ we have |{q}∼∗ | ≤ 2 and for all qi, qj ∈ Q:
∀α,β∈Acts
(
(qi 6= qj∧α 6= β) =⇒ ∃nqαni ∼∗ qα
n
j
)
(♣)
So far we have created a transitional and epistemic structure
over the set Q′ ∪ {sink}. While this construction may seem
involved, it serves a simple purpose. Observe that a uniform
strategy for agent 1 can enforce a path from qi to qα
H
i only
by repeatedly executing the action α ∈ Acts; any deviation
from choosing α is punished by banishing to sink . Thus, the
requirement of uniformity together with Condition (♣) yield
that if qα
H
i is reached from qi and q
αH
j is reached from qj
over the same strategy, then the strategy repeatedly executes
the same action over both the paths.
The selected value of H easily enables a construction that
satisfies Condition (♣). An example realisation is shown in
q0
real
q1
real
q2
real
1
1
1
1
1
1
A B A B A B
A B A B A B
A B A B A B
A B A B A B
A B A B A B
A B A B A B
Figure 3: Enforcing uniformity for action A.
Fig. 3, where Q = {q0, q1, q2} and d1(q0) = {A,B}. Note
that the transitions to the sink state are omitted. The key to
understanding the magic formula H is to notice that for each
pair of states (hence the Newton symbol) we distinguish each
pair of differing actions by introducing a new level into the
tower of Fig. 3.
The CEGM MQ = 〈Agt, St′,Π′, pi′,Act ∪ {nop}, d′, o′〉
is defined as follows:
• St′ = (St \ Q) ∪Q′ ∪ {sink} and Π′ = Π ∪ {real};
• pi′(q) = pi(q) ∪ {real} for all q ∈ St and pi′(q) = ∅ for
the remaining states;
• the new protocol:
– d′i(q) = di(q), for all q ∈ St \ Q and i ∈ {1, 2}
(the inherited protocol),
– d′1(qα
n
) = d1(q) for all qα
n ∈ Q′,
– d′2(qα
H
) = d2(q) for each qα
H ∈ Q′,
– d′i(q) = {nop} otherwise, where i ∈ {1, 2};
• the new transition function:
o′(q, α, β) =
{
o(q, α, β) if q ∈ St′ \ Q′ or q = qαHi ∈ Q′
as defined above for the remaining cases.
Note that all the states copied fromM are labeled with real.
The new transition function o′ behaves as follows: (1) if an
action is executed in a state q outside ofQ′, then the outcome
is the same as for o; (2) if q = qi ∈ Q′ and q 6= qαHi , then
agent 1 is in control and can decide to either execute α and
move towards qα
H
i or dive in sink ; (3) if q = q
αH
i , then agent
2 regains its part of control.
Finally, we define the indistinguishability relation ∼′1 of
agent 1 over MQ by requesting that q ∼′1 q′ iff q, q′ ∈ St \Q
and q ∼1 q′ or q, q′ ∈ Q′ and q ∼∗ q′.
We can now define the final translation T (M) of CEGM
M. Namely, T (M) is obtained by an iterative reduction of all
information sets of size greater than 2 until there are none.
Theorem 2. For each q ∈ St and φ ∈ ATL1U that does not
contain real: M, q |=O
ir
φ ⇐⇒ T (M), q |=O
ir
T (φ).
Proof sketch. The proof follows by induction on structure of
φ. It is sufficient to prove the thesis for a single step of reduc-
tion, i.e., MQ instead T (M). We omit the details of a rather
tedious but not difficult proof due to lack of space.
We can now provide the sketch of the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof sketch. We only need to show ∆P2 -hardness. The
method used to this end in [Jamroga and Dix, 2006a] is
based on reduction of SNSAT [Laroussinie et al., 2001] into
verifying certain ATLir formulae over two-player CEGMs.
Namely, a set F of propositional formulae in CNF is given
as an instance of SNSAT and each of these is translated
into a CEGM component in a satisfiability-encoding manner
(see [Jamroga and Dix, 2006a], Sec. 3.1 and Fig. 2). The
resulting model is denoted by M∆. In [Jamroga and Dix,
2006a], Theorem 4, a formula Φ ∈ ATLir is produced with
such a property that F is satisfiable iff M∆ |= Φ. This for-
mula contains the Next-step operator, but it can be easily re-
placed with Until to obtain a satisfiability-preserving formula
Φ′ ∈ ATL1U . Now, by Theorem 2 we obtain M∆ |= Φ′ iffT (M∆) |= T (Φ′). All the steps of the procedure outlined
above yield polynomial results w.r.t. size of inputs.
3.2 Agents that Don’t See Much (Few Info Sets)
For memoryless agents with limited observational capabili-
ties, model checking becomes easy.
Theorem 3. Let k be a constant. Model checking ATLir
over the class of CEGMs with at most k information sets per
agent is P-complete.
Proof. The lower bound follows from P-completeness of
ATLIr [Alur et al., 2002]. For the upper bound, observe that
each agent has only O(|Act|k) available strategies, and one
can determine if a given strategy is winning in linear time by
CTL model checking. Thus, we can check the strategies one
by one in deterministic polynomial time.
4 Abilities of Single Agents: Perfect Recall
We continue the analysis from the previous section, now turn-
ing to specifications in ATLiR.
4.1 Good Memory, Agents that Don’t Miss Much
Model checking of agents with perfect recall and almost per-
fect information also becomes easy.
Theorem 4. Let k be a constant. Model checking ATLiR
over CEGMs with information sets of size at most k is P-
complete.
Proof. The lower bound follows from P-completeness of
ATLIR [Alur et al., 2002]. For the upper bound, we use
the construction in [Guelev et al., 2011] that translates model
checking ATLiR in CEGM M to verification of perfect in-
formation strategies in a CGS M ′. Note that the number
of transitions in the new model is |M ′| = O(|M | · 2|is|) =
O(|M | · 2k) = O(|M |). Moreover, model checking for per-
fect information can be done in polynomial time w.r.t. the
size of the model.
4.2 Good Memory, Agents that Don’t See Much
Consider now the case of models with few information sets.
Theorem 5. Model checking 1ATLiR over CEGMs with at
most 2 information sets per agent is EXPTIME-complete.
To obtain the lower bound, we develop a general reduction
from model checking arbitrary CEGMs to verification of such
restricted models, presented below.
Model Translation Let M = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi,Act , d, o〉 be
a CEGM and n = |St/∼1| be the number of information
sets for agent 1 ∈ Agt. We label the information sets of ∼1
with ordinals from 0 to n − 1 and let ctr : St → N be a
function that assigns to each state q ∈ St the number ctr(q)
of [q]∼1 . Moreover, let ctr i(q) denote the ith bit of binary
representation of ctr(q), for 0 ≤ i ≤ dlog ne.
Let q
γ−→ q′ be a transition inM . We introduce 2×dlog ne
fresh states F = {qγ,0i , qγ,1i }dlognei=0 and the usual sink state.
We use the states from F to encode ctr(q) and ctr(q′).
Namely, we remove fromM the transition q
γ−→ q′ and insert
its replacement:
q
γ−→ (1)
q
γ,ctr0(q)
0
?−→ . . . ?−→ qγ,ctrdlogne(q)dlogne
?−→ (2)
q′γ,ctr0(q
′)
0
?−→ . . . ?−→ q′γ,ctrdlogne(q
′)
dlogne (3)
?−→ q′ (4)
where ? should be replaced with the bundle of all possible
actions for the grand coalition, i.e., Act |Agt|. This process is
repeated for each transition in M . For future use we denote
the sequence of states in subsequence (2) above by enc(q)
and the sequence in (3) by enc′(q′).
In the next stage we unify the protocol for agent 1 by firstly
adding the usual fresh sink state and adding for each action
α ∈ Act \ d1(q) and β ∈ dAgt\{1}(q) a new transition q (α,β)−→
sink . Intuitively, agent 1 is punished for not following the
original protocol by being banished to sink . We also copy
the labeling of q to all the intermediate states qˆ ∈ F , i.e.,
q ∈ pi(p) iff qˆ ∈ pi(p) for all p ∈ Π.
Finally, we add to the model the indistinguishability rela-
tion for agent 1 as follows: (1) the original states from St,
sink , and {qγ,0i }dlognei=0 are labeled with blue; (2) the states
from {qγ,1i }dlognei=0 are labeled with green; (3) we assume that
agent 1 can observe only the color of a state.
We illustrate a part of the transformation process in Fig. 4.
We assume that there is only one agent and states q, q′ belong
to two information sets s.t. ctr(q) = 10bin and ctr(q′) =
11bin. Moreover, Act = {A,B} and d1(q) = {A}.
The CEGM that is the result of the above transformations
is denoted by T e(M). As shown in the following theorem,
the translation preserves a certain set of safety properties.
q q′M
T e(M) q qA1 qA0 q′A1 q′A1 q′
sink
A
A
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
BB
Figure 4: Reducing the number of inf. sets for a single agent.
Theorem 6. For ATLiR formulae 〈〈A〉〉γ containing no
nested strategic modalities and no operator X, we have:
M, q |=iR 〈〈A〉〉γ ⇐⇒ T e(M), q |=iR 〈〈A〉〉γ.
Proof sketch. For simplicity let A = {1}. The proof of the
general case differs only in the number of the fresh states used
to encode the observations of the protagonist coalition. A
possible scheme of such encoding can be based on enumerat-
ing the information sets of each i ∈ A with functions ctr i(·).
Then, each transition q
γ−→ q′ is swapped with its replace-
ment, where the agents of the coalition take turns in a fixed
order to enforce the encoding of source and target informa-
tion sets using separate fresh locations. These locations are
created and labeled as in the single-agent above.
We establish a correspondence between iR-strategies
over M and T e(M) that preserves U and G. Let
λ = q0q1 . . . qk be a history in M . By lft(λ) =
q0enc(q0)enc
′(q1)q1 . . . enc(qk−1)enc′(qk)qk we denote the
lifting of λ to T e(M). Note that by construc-
tion each finite history in T e(M) is of form λ′ =
q0enc(q0)enc
′(q1)q1 . . . enc(qk−1)enc′(qk)qkR, whereR is
a sequence containing only fresh states. We can thus define
the casting of λ′ to M as cst(λ′) = q0q1 . . . qk.
Now, let s1 be an iR-strategy for agent 1, over M . We
define the lifting lft(s1) of s1 to T e(M) as a function s.t.
lft(s1)(λ
′) = s1(cst(λ′)) for all the histories λ′ over T e(M)
such that λ′[0], λ′F 6∈ F and lft(s1)(λ′) = B for a fixed B ∈
Act for all the remaining histories. Intuitively, lft(s1) makes
the same choices as s1, unless the path reaches a fresh state
where the fixed action is used.
Let s′1 be an iR-strategy for agent 1, over T e(M). The
casting cst(s′1) of s
′
1 to M is a function s.t. cst(s
′
1)(λ) =
s′1(lft(λ)) for each history λ over M . Intuitively, cst(s
′
1)
makes the same choices as s′1 while ignoring the fresh states.
To conclude the proof, it is easy to see that s1 enforces
p along each path starting from q iff lft(s1) does so. More-
over, it is routine to show that the uniformity is preserved, i.e.,
lft(s1) and cst(s′1) as defined above are iR-strategies.
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof. The inclusion is straightforward from [Guelev et al.,
2011, Prop. 33]. The lower bound follows from Theorem 6
and the EXPTIME-hardness of the general problem.
4.3 Special Case: Blindfold Agents with Recall
Two information sets are enough to make model checking
ATLiR as hard as in arbitrary models. What happens if there
is only a single information set, comprising of the whole state
space? We call such CEGM blindfold. It turns out that
model checking ATLiR over blindfold CEGM is actually
easier than in the general case.
Observe that over blindfold CEGMs joint memoryful
strategies for any A ⊆ Agt can be interpreted as functions
σA : N→ Act, where σA(i) is the joint action selected in the
ith step by the coalition A. Moreover, we write out(σA) to
denote the set of the outcomes of σA, as the initial state is not
identifiable.
Theorem 7. Model checking ATLiR over the class of blind-
fold CEGMs is in PSPACE.
Proof. It suffices to show that 〈〈A〉〉pU r and 〈〈A〉〉Gp can be
verified in PSPACE, where A ⊆ Agt and p, r ∈ Π. The
idea is as follows: firstly we show that if these properties are
true, then they can be attained by using finite strategies with
memory that needs to cover only all the possible subsets of
the state space. Secondly, we use this limit to build a model
checker in a form of a non-deterministic Turing machine.
Let us start with q |= 〈〈A〉〉pU r and let σA : N →
ActA be a joint strategy for A s.t. λ |= pU r for each
λ ∈ out(σA). For each i ∈ N we inductively de-
fine the set Ai as follows: A0 = St \ [[r]] and Ai+1 =
{states reachable in one step from Ai via σA} \ [[r]] for i > 0.
It follows from the definition of the Until modality that
there exists the smallest index kfin ∈ N s.t. Ai = ∅ for all
i ≥ kfin . Now, let us select any B ∈ {Ai}kfini=0 and let
kmin , kmax ∈ N be the minimal and maximal, resp., in-
dices s.t. Akmin = B = Akmax . If kmin < kmax , then
we can transform σA into σBA as follows: σ
B
A (i) = σA(i)
for all 0 ≤ i < kmin and σBA (i) = σA(i + kmax − kmin)
for all i ≥ kmin . It is easy to see that λ |= pU r for each
λ ∈ out(σBA ). The process of recomputing the sets {Ai}i∈I
and further reducing the working strategy can be repeated
until no reduction is possible, i.e., the family {Ai}i∈I con-
tains no repetitions. This in turn means that I ≤ 2|St| and
kfin ≤ 2|St|. Therefore, there exists a joint strategy forA that
enforces pU r in less than 2|St| steps.
The construction for 〈〈A〉〉Gp follows analogously.
We now outline how to build a non-deterministic Turing
machine for 〈〈A〉〉pU r and 〈〈A〉〉Gp. The machine is equipped
with a deterministic |St|-bit counter that enables to track the
progress of execution up to 2|St| steps. The machine con-
secutively guesses joint actions for A for the current step in-
dicated by the counter, executes them and then increments
the counter. Only recently reached states are preserved. The
machine rejects if the counter exceeds 2|St| or a state vio-
lating the verified property has been reached. It accepts if
while traversing along p-labeled states a state labeled with r
has been reached along each path (the case of pU r) or a loop
has been detected (the case of Gp).
5 Abilities of Coalitions
In Sections 3 and 4, we focused on formulae containing only
singleton coalitions. We now briefly wrap up the study, pre-
senting analogous results for multi-player coalitions. A sum-
Coalitions Small info sets Few info sets
(|is| = const) (#is = const)
Memoryless ∆P2 -complete IP-compl./∆P2 -compl.
Perfect recall ? inPSPACE for #is = 1
undecidable for #is > 1
Figure 5: Model checking complexity for abilities of coalitions
mary is shown in Figure 5; again, the cases with lower com-
plexity than for the general problem are highlighted.
We observe that, for models with small information sets,
∆P2 -completeness follows from Theorem 1 and the complex-
ity of the general problem [Schobbens, 2004; Jamroga and
Dix, 2006a]. Moreover, Theorem 7 (inclusion in PSPACE
for blindfold agents) is formulated and proved for the whole
language of ATLiR. Finally, our reduction in Theorem 6
works also for coalitional abilities. Thus, model checking
ATLiR for #is = k and k ≥ 2 is as hard as in the general
case, ergo: undecidable.2
The last case that we address is that of coalitional abilities
for memoryless agents with weak observational capabilities.
Theorem 8. Model checking ATLir over CEGMs with at
most 2 information sets per agent is ∆P2 -complete.
Proof sketch. We adapt the proof of ∆P2 -hardness
from [Jamroga and Dix, 2006a] by using a team of ver-
ifiers V = {v10 , . . . , vn∗m0 , v1, . . . , vk} where n is the
number of nested queries, m is the maximal number of
clauses per query and k is the number of propositional
variables in the instance of SNSAT2. Each agent vi0 controls
the choice of the literal in a particular clause, and each agent
vj controls the valuation of the Boolean variable underlying
“her” literal. Every agent can only distinguish between the
states she controls and the rest of the state space. Finally, we
replace each occurrence of 〈〈v〉〉 with 〈〈V 〉〉 in the formula
from [Jamroga and Dix, 2006a], and the reduction goes
through.
Note that the above proof requires that the number of
agents in the class of models is variable (and is a parameter of
the model checking problem). As it turns out, the requirement
is essential for Theorem 8 to hold. This is especially impor-
tant, as a fixed finite set of agents is often assumed before-
hand, when defining the syntax of the agent logic. In those
cases, model checking agents with limited epistemic capabil-
ities is easy even in the coalitional case.
Theorem 9. Let k, n be constants. Model checking ATLir
over the class of CEGMs with at most n agents and at most k
information sets per agent is P-complete.
Proof. Straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 3
(the number of coalitional strategies is now polynomial).
2 Alternatively, one can observe that the undecidability proof
in [Dima and Tiplea, 2011] actually uses a model with #is = 2.
6 Conclusions
Verification of autonomous agents in multi-agent systems
is an important path of research. Despite some recent ad-
vances [Huang and van der Meyden, 2014; Pilecki et al.,
2014; Busard, 2017; Belardinelli et al., 2017; Jamroga et al.,
2017], the problem is still open due to its inherent computa-
tional complexity. In this paper, we show that the complexity
is in fact lower than expected in some borderline cases, in
particular for agents with consistently good (resp. weak) ob-
servational and mental capabilities. We also show that, for
agents whose capabilities are “in between,” the problem is as
hard as in the general case. While the former kind of results
is clearly more interesting from the practical point of view,
the latter ones have been more demanding. In order to prove
them, we developed reduction techniques that may be as well
useful in other formal problems in AI.
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